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In June 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a 
pandemic alert concerning the spread of an influenza A (H1N1) 
virus that showed distinctive genetic characteristics vis-à-vis both 
seasonal influenza strains and vaccine strains. The main mutation 
occurred in the gene coding for hemagglutinin (HA). Mathemati-
cal models were developed to calculate the transmissibility of the 
virus; the results indicated a significant overlap with the trans-
missibility of previous pandemic strains and seasonal strains. The 
remarkable feature of A/(H1N1)pdm09, compared with seasonal 
strains, is its high fatality rate and its higher incidence among 
younger people. Data provided by the WHO on the number of 
deaths caused by A/(H1N1)pdm09 only include laboratory-con-
firmed cases. Some authors suggest that these data could under-
estimate the magnitude of the event, as laboratory confirmation is 
not obtained in all cases.
It is important to bear in mind that the A/(H1N1)pdm09 virus is 
still circulating in the population. It is therefore essential to main-
tain its epidemiological and virological surveillance.
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Summary
Influenza pandemics in history
The cyclic occurrence of epidemic and pandemic phe-
nomena attributable to influenza  A virus is related to 
the ability of the virus to modify its two main surface 
proteins, hemagglutinin (HA) (which allows the virus to 
adhere to epithelial cells in the upper respiratory tract) 
and neuraminidase (NA), both of which play a very im-
portant role in the pathogenesis of the disease. Antigenic 
variability of influenza A virus may occur as antigenic 
drifts (minor variability) or antigenic shifts (major vari-
ability). Antigenic drifts (such as nucleotide substitu-
tions, deletions and insertions of HA and NA genes) are 
responsible for seasonal epidemics of influenza virus, 
while antigenic shifts cause pandemics. The most im-
portant changes are due to the reassortment of viruses 
of swine and avian origin with viruses of human origin, 
like those responsible for the pandemics that occurred 
in 1918 (H1N1), 1957 (H2N2) and 1968 (H3N2) [1, 2].
The H1N1 virus reappeared in 1977, and is still circulat-
ing in humans, while the H3N2 virus was the most com-
mon up until 2009 [3, 4].
The “new” pandemic
In April 2009, a new virus appeared in Mexico and Cali-
fornia (US), and was responsible for the first pandem-
ics of the 21st century. It spreads rapidly from person to 
person, and is not related to any circulating inter-pan-
demic viruses. The new virus was labeled  A/(H1N1)
pdm09. It is a quadruple reassortant virus, consisting of 
two swine-origin viruses, one avian-origin virus and one 
human-origin virus. To be more precise, molecular stud-
ies have identified the North American H3N2 triple reas-
sortant viruses circulating among swine, a classic swine 
H1N1 virus, and an “avian-like” swine H1N1 virus cir-
culating in Europe and Asia  [5]. This “new” virus has 
proved remarkably different from the classic seasonal 
influenza H1N1 viruses and the viruses used to prepare 
vaccines [6].
The new virus spread rapidly around the world, primar-
ily infecting children, young adults and individuals with 
lung and heart diseases, though the majority of cases 
were of low-grade severity and were self-limiting. The 
first epidemics occurred in Veracruz (Mexico), start-
ing on 12 April 2009, and the virus was isolated by the 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) on April  14th. By 
the end of April, the WHO had declared a phase-5 pan-
demic alert, and on 11 June this was upgraded to phase 6 
(Tab. I), owing to the large number of individuals and na-
Tab. I. A/(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic timeline.
Date Step
12th April 2009 Epidemic starts in Mexico (Veracruz)
17th April 2009 CDC isolates A/(H1N1)pdm09 virus
25th April 2009 Public health alert is declared
27th April 2009 Pandemic phase-4 alert
29th April 2009 Pandemic phase-5 alert
11th June 2009 Pandemic phase-6 alert
11th August 2010 Post-pandemic phase is declared
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tions involved. In June 2009, the WHO reported 94,512 
cases (including 429 deaths) and 135 nations were in-
volved.
Burden of disease
From April 2009 to August 2010 (when the pandemic 
was declared to be over) [7], the number of laboratory-
confirmed cases amounted to 651,449: 75.4% of these 
(491,382 cases) attributable to the A/(H1N1)pdm09 vi-
rus; 1.4% (35,069  cases) to the A(H1N1) seasonal in-
fluenza virus; 12.4% (81,070 cases) to non-typed A vi-
ruses; and the remaining 5.3% (34,481 cases) to the in-
fluenza B virus. The trend over the period analyzed is 
shown in Figure 1 [8].
The mean age of the individuals affected was 18.1 years: 
64% of the cases occurred in 10- to 29-year-olds, and 
only 1% were aged 60 and over; 18.4% of the patients 
had chronic comorbidities.
The clinical manifestations were unexceptional, the most 
common symptoms being cough (84.9% of cases), high 
temperature (84.7%), headache (66.5%), runny nose 
(60.1%), and joint and muscle pain (58.1%). Despite 
these nonspecific clinical manifestations, some authors 
recommend considering cough and high temperature as 
the only parameters for identifying cases [9].
Mortality
During the pandemic, a total of 18,631 deaths were re-
ported among the laboratory-confirmed cases, yielding 
a fatality rate of 2.9% (95% CI 0.0-6.7%), with an esti-
mated fatality rate of 0.02% among all infected individu-
als [10]. Although this fatality rate cannot be considered 
a valid indicator, it prompted some to claim that the 
public health measures taken to deal with the pandemic 
had been excessive. It is important to bear in mind, how-
ever, that these figures are probably underestimated, as 
not all deaths involved laboratory-confirmed cases (as is 
usually the case during inter-pandemic periods). A re-
cent study estimated that between 123,000 and 203,000 
people died during the pandemics, and 62-85% of these 
were under 65 years old (and often under 14 years old): 
these figures suggest that the mortality rate for the 2009 
influenza pandemic was in fact 10 times higher than the 
mortality rate resulting from the laboratory-confirmed 
cases. If the same method of calculation were applied 
to seasonal influenza epidemics, the virus would be 
responsible for 148,000-249,000 deaths, but would in-
volve a larger proportion of elderly people. Indeed, only 
19% of deaths involve patients under 65 years old dur-
ing seasonal influenza epidemics. This epidemiological 
pattern gives the impression that the 2009 pandemic was 
more severe than seasonal influenza endemics – an as-
sumption that may be confirmed when it is possible to 
obtain an estimation in terms of life years lost [10].
The fatality rate during a pandemic is calculated from 
the number of deaths due to the virus type investigated 
in relation to the number of cases in a given population. 
Analysis of the data shows marked heterogeneity in the 
fatality rates due to the  A/(H1N1)pdm09  virus, which 
range from 1 to 10,000 deaths per 100,000 infections. In 
other words, the severity of pandemics is unpredictable 
and hard to estimate on the basis of fatality rates [11].
Fig. 1. Number of specimens positive for influenza by subtypes (from 19 April 2009 to 24 July 2010).
THE 2009 NEW PANDEMIC
E21
In-hospital mortality
Among the indicators of a pandemic’s severity, the in-
hospital mortality rate should be taken into account. In 
the case of the A/(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic, this rate var-
ied considerably (from 0 to 52%) depending on the type 
of hospital involved and the gross domestic product of 
the country considered. In high-income countries, where 
standards of treatment are higher, the estimated in-hos-
pital mortality rate ranged between 1% and 3%, and did 
not depend on the type of hospital or the type of ward.
In all countries, the burden of hospitalization was high-
er among children and younger adults, though the in-
hospital mortality rate was always higher among elderly 
patients, mainly because they often had comorbidities. 
Despite their lower risk of infection, older people had 
higher fatality rates than younger patients in the event of 
hospitalization [12].
The situation in Italy
In Italy, the influenza surveillance network (INFLUNET) 
actively follows up 2.1% of the Italian population. Com-
paring data on seasonal influenza epidemics, the network 
showed, during the 2009 pandemic period, that the infec-
tion peaked in the 50th week (while this usually happens 
in the 4th to 8th week), with an intensity that was similar 
to other years. The network also found an increase in hos-
pital admissions due to influenza-related complications, 
with 1,100 hospitalizations, 592 of which were severe 
cases (admission to intensive care unit, acute respiratory 
distress syndrome, need for intubation or extra-corporeal 
membrane oxygenator); 204 patients died [13].
The A/(H1N1)pdm09 virus continued to circulate after 
the pandemic of 2009. It was estimated that both the A 
(84%) and the B (16%) influenza viruses were circulat-
ing simultaneously during the 2014-2015 seasonal influ-
enza. Specifically, the A/(H1N1)pdm09 virus accounted 
for 52% of all laboratory-confirmed cases, and for 76% 
of all severe clinical manifestations. This is the epidemic 
with the highest number of severe cases reported since 
the 2009 pandemic [14].
Features related to severity
The severity of influenza epidemics varies, depending 
on the geographical area involved, and can be measured 
by estimating the burden of disease at both the individ-
ual and community levels. The extent of a pandemic is 
influenced by several different factors, which depend 
on the features of the population affected, and severity 
assessment on a global level is not as straightforward 
as on the local level. It therefore becomes essential to 
implement a surveillance system in order to accurately 
monitor epidemiological trends and detect changes in 
the pattern of illness, as well as the characteristics of the 
infectious agent. Surveillance is essential for the preven-
tion and control of influenza illness. Being able to recog-
nize the specific circulating strain and the characteristics 
of the seasonal epidemic is important in order to identify 
viruses to be used in vaccines and to detect novel in-
fluenza viruses with potential for pandemic spread. Fur-
thermore, combining virological surveillance with epi-
demiological surveillance gives us the chance to collect 
useful information for developing severity indicators.
Virological characteristics
Virological surveillance is essential in order to detect 
changes in the viral genome that may have an impact on 
the pathogenicity of the virus and on the effectiveness 
of influenza vaccines. Vaccine effectiveness decreases 
when the viral strains in the vaccine and the circulating 
viruses do not perfectly match [15, 16].
Mutations may be irrelevant; alternatively, they may 
modify the structure of epitopes (antibody-binding 
sites), thus giving rise to new serotypes and becoming 
critical in causing clinically relevant symptoms.
Critical mutations are those occurring in hemagglutinin 
(HA), the non-structural proteins (NS1), and polymerase 
(PB2). If these mutations occur simultaneously, increased 
virulence can be expected. Amino acids 187 and 222 in 
HA are involved in determining receptor-binding affin-
ity and tissue-specific tropism: D187/D222 for  α(2,6) 
in receptors on the human respiratory tract, D187/G222 
for α(2,6) and α(2,3) in swine, and E187/G222 for α(2,3) 
in avian species. The new pandemic virus was character-
ized by major genomic mutations. Two have been identi-
fied: the so-called D222G and D222N, in which aspartic 
acid (D) is substituted by glycine (G) or asparagine (N), 
respectively. The D222G mutation is responsible for a 
change in receptor-binding affinity; this change enables 
the virus to bind to sialic acid receptors α(2,6), located on 
the ciliated epithelial cells in the upper respiratory tract, 
and to sialic acid receptors α(2,3), located on the ciliated 
epithelial cells in the lower respiratory tract [17]. A recent 
review showed a correlation between the D222G mutation 
in HA and the most severe and fatal cases of influenza. It 
also established that viral strains isolated during the pan-
demic did not carry other mutations in genes associated 
with increased virulence [18].
Epidemiological characteristics
Transmissibility is an important aspect of a pandemic. It 
is related both to intrinsic features of the agent causing 
the disease and to the public health measures adopted to 
deal with it. It can be measured by calculating the R0, 
i.e. the ability of an index case to infect other susceptible 
individuals. This indicator depends on the risk of trans-
mission by contact (β), the average number of contacts 
per unit of time (κ), and the duration of the virus’s infec-
tiveness (D), which is agent-specific. R0 is calculated by 
means of the formula: R0 = β * κ * D. All possible pub-
lic health measures may modify the R0, in which case 
the R0 is replaced with a Reproduction Control (RC) 
number. The RC depends on both the R0 and the public 
health measures taken, and is obviously always lower 
than the R0. If the RC is lower than 1, the epidemic will 
stop; if it is higher than 1, the epidemic will only decline 
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in intensity. The R0 value calculated for influenza vi-
ruses varies: in the case of the viral strain responsible for 
the pandemic in 1918-1919, for instance, it was about 
2 (ranging from 1.4 to 2.8), while for a strain respon-
sible for a seasonal influenza epidemic it is 1.3 (ranging 
from 0.9 to 2.1). These values do not differ greatly from 
the R0 value calculated for the A/(H1N1)pdm09 virus, 
which was 1.4-1.6. Since all these values overlap signifi-
cantly, it is reasonable to assume a similar transmissibil-
ity among the strains considered [19].
Conclusions
The influenza  A/(H1N1)pdm09 virus revealed some 
unique features in comparison with other circulating 
influenza viruses. These characteristics, combined with 
the state of immunity of the populations affected, ac-
counted for the first pandemic of the 21st century. The 
viral and infectivity characteristics of A/(H1N1)pdm09 
were entirely comparable to the characteristics of sea-
sonal influenza strains, but the virus affected a larger 
proportion of children and young adults. It was conse-
quently responsible for a heavier burden of disease, de-
spite its similar virulence.
The picture was much the same in Italy, where the influ-
enza epidemic peaked earlier than usual in 2009-2010.
It is important to bear in mind that the A/(H1N1)pdm09 
virus is still circulating in the population. It is therefore 
essential to maintain its epidemiological and virological 
surveillance.
In conclusion, A/(H1N1)pdm09 is a new virus which is 
similar to seasonal influenza viruses in terms of disease 
incidence and transmissibility, but different in terms of 
its sudden appearance, rapid spread and severity of clini-
cal manifestations in young people.
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